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This paper introduces novice researchers to the differences in philosophical perspectives and 
the major research implications arising from them.  It is our contention that research should 
not be methodologically led, rather that methodological choice should be consequential to the 
researcher’s philosophical stance and the social science phenomenon to be investigated.  
Several philosophical approaches are possible in the science of research, however we 
perceive that more extreme approaches can be delimiting.  We argue that only an 
intermediate philosophical approach allows the researcher to match philosophy, 





As suggested by Remenyi et al. (1998), there are several major questions that require 
significant consideration by researchers such as „How to research?‟ and „What to research?‟  
But central to the researcher‟s answers is their perspective on „Why research?‟  There are 
many practical reasons why a researcher has chosen to engage in research and, in many cases, 
they may have already decided upon their methodology – qualitative (such as case studies or 
focus groups), quantitative (such as a mail or telephone survey), or a combination of both. 
Similarly, what to research may have been chosen for various reasons, such as a researcher‟s 
own academic interests. However, as a researcher reviews the philosophical literature, they 
quickly appreciate that choosing a research methodology, that is, the how of research, 
involves something much deeper than practicalities – it necessitates a philosophical solution 
to „Why research?‟  For example, an extreme post-modernist‟s answer would be that „truth‟ 
does not exist, hence research is redundant as the meaning of anything is indeterminate.  
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Developing a philosophical perspective requires that the researcher make several core 
assumptions concerning two dimensions:  the nature of society and the nature of science 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  The sociological dimension involves a choice between two 
views of society:  regulatory or radical change. Society‟s evolvement is seen as either arising 
from the status quo or from what can be. In a regulatory view of society, the researcher 
assumes that society evolves rationally.  Society is viewed as unified and cohesive, whereas 
the sociology of radical change views society as in constant conflict as humans struggle to 
free themselves from the domination of societal structures (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  These 
contrasting views are the basis of distinct, and often diametrically opposing, schools of 
thought – a rational view of society is the basis of modernism whereas a radical change 
perspective underlies post-modernism.  The other dimension, science, involves either a 
subjective or an objective approach to research, and these two major philosophical approaches 
are delineated by several core assumptions concerning ontology (reality), epistemology 
(knowledge), human nature (pre-determined or not), and methodology. Whatever their 
sociological persuasion, the researcher will find that these assumptions are consequential to 
each other, that is, their view of ontology effects their epistemological persuasion which, in 
turn, effects their view of human nature, consequently, choice of methodology logically 
follows the assumptions the researcher has already made. However, as discussed later, the 
researcher should be aware that their philosophical assumptions might have a significant 
impact on “What to research?” 
 
The most comprehensive philosophical framework based on these dimensions has been 
developed by Burrell and Morgan (1979).  However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
present a thorough discussion on the nature of society.  Our focus in this work is the nature of 
science, yet we have briefly discussed the sociological dimension in order to impart to new 
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researchers, or uninformed researchers, that: (1) differing sociological perspectives exist, and 
(2) a radical view of society may offer new and creative approaches to researchers as most 
business research has been from a rational view of society. The reader is referred to Burrell 
and Morgan (1979) for a comprehensive presentation on philosophy‟s sociological dimension. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to initiate the novice researcher into the field of philosophy. 
Concentrating on the nature of science, we begin with a description of the core assumptions 
underlying the subjectivist and objectivist philosophies, followed by a discussion on the major 
research implications arising from these philosophies. Based on the tensions between 
opposing camps, we then consider „Is there a right approach to research?‟  Our closing 








The Nature of Science 
Objectivism and subjectivism have been described as a continuum‟s polar opposites with 
varying philosophical positions aligned between them.  The objectivist approach to social 
research developed from the natural sciences – social science researchers decided to employ 
the highly successful methods of the natural sciences to investigate social science phenomena.  
However, subjectivism arose as critics argued, and continue to argue, that both sciences are 
disparate.  As indicated by Figure 1 objectivism and subjectivism, have been labelled 
Objectivist   Subjectivist 
 
Quantitative   Qualitative 
Positivist    Phenomenological 
Scientific    Humanistic 





Alternative Philosophical Paradigm Names 
 
Adapted from Hussey and Hussey (1997) 
*Added by authors 
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The Subjective-Objective Dimension 
 
 
The subjectivist        The objectivist 
approach to                          approach to  
social science Assumption                                        social science 
                              
 
Nominalism Ontology    Realism 
 
Anti-positivism Epistemology    Positivism 
 
Voluntarism Human Nature    Determinism 
 
Ideographic Methodology    Nomothetic 
 
 
Figure 2  
A Scheme for Analysing Assumptions About the Nature of Social Science 
 
Source:  Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
variously in the literature.  For example, Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) entitled them as 
positivism and phenomenology and Hughes and Sharrock (1997) described them as 
positivism and interpretive alternative.   
 
Figure 2 depicts the two major philosophical traditions, their respective assumptions, and the 
terminology associated with them. The first assumption listed in Figure 2, ontology, relates to 
the nature of reality, that is, what things, if any, have existence or whether reality is “the 
product of one‟s mind” (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 1).  As explained later, the researcher‟s 
view of reality is the corner stone to all other assumptions, that is, what is assumed here 
predicates the researcher‟s other assumptions.  The second assumption, epistemology, 
concerns the study of the nature of knowledge, that is, “How is it possible, if it is, for us to 
gain knowledge of the world?” (Hughes and Sharrock 1997:  5).  It is concerned with “the 
nature, validity, and limits of inquiry” (Rosenau 1992: 109).  Much of the research that has 
been completed in organisational science has been based on the assumption that reality is 
objective and „out there‟ waiting to be discovered and that this knowledge can be identified 
and communicated to others.  The third assumption, concerning human nature, involves 
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whether or not the researcher perceives man as the controller or as the controlled (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979), and the final assumption, methodology, is the researcher‟s tool-kit – it 
represents all the means available to social scientists to investigate phenomena.   
 
Based on the core assumptions of the nature of science, there are several taxonomies that lay 
between the extreme philosophical positions.  Figure 3 illustrates Morgan and Smircich‟s  
(1980) continuum of six major philosophical perspectives.  In the following discussion, we 
contrast the two extreme positions of the continuum in order to illustrate how a researcher‟s 
ontological stance influences the core assumptions concerning epistemology and human 
nature.  The extreme subjectivist ontological position is often called solipsism.  These 
extremists maintain that reality does not exist outside oneself, that ones‟ mind is ones‟ world, 
Figure 3:  Network of Basic Assumptions Characterising the Subjectivist-Objectivist Debate Within Social Science 
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hence reality is all imagination (Morgan and Smircich, 1980).  Therefore, the relevant 
epistemological stance is that knowledge cannot be discovered, as it is subjectively acquired – 
everything is relative. This is reflected in work on language by Sapir (1949) and Whorf 
(1956).  In their investigations involving the contrast of American Native Indian languages 
with English, they both concluded that an individual‟s perception of reality is controlled by 
one‟s language (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997; Hunt, 1993).  In line with these assumptions is 
that human nature is voluntaristic, humankind has freewill and is autonomous; humans are 
intentional beings, shaping the world “within the realm of their own immediate experience” 
(Morgan and Smircich, 1980: 494).   
 
Proponents of the other extreme position, objectivism, are realists.  They contend that the 
world predates individuals – it is prior to the existence of human consciousness and, whether 
or not humans assign labels and perceive the existence of an external reality, the world will 
still exist as an empirical entity, made up of hard tangible and relatively immutable structures, 
independent of the cognitive efforts of individuals (Gill and Johnson, 1997).  Therefore, valid 
knowledge about a concrete reality can only be discovered through sense observation and 
measurement and any reference to the intangible or subjective is excluded as meaningless 
(Giddens, 1976; Morgan and Smircich, 1980). On the nature of humans, objectivists contend 
that the relationship between man and society is deterministic, that is, we are born into a 
world in which there are causal laws that explain the patterns to our social behaviour 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991).
1
  Although we have utilised these positions for explanation 
purposes, very few researcher‟s today make such extreme assumptions. Most business 
research has been from a more moderate objective position.  
 
                                                 
1 The reader is referred to Morgan and Smircich’s (1980) article, pp. 494-495, and Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) 
book for a comprehensive discussion on varying philosophical perspectives. 
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Based on the foregoing discussion, the following table is a practical guide to the 
appropriateness of a research method to a philosophical approach. 
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Figure 4:  Research Tactics and Their Philosophical Bases 
 
Source:  Remenyi et al. (1998) 
 
 
As indicated by Figure 4, some research methods that the reader may have considered 
belonging strictly to either an objective or subjective philosophical approach can have a dual 
utilisation
2
.  For instance, as exemplified by Remenyi et al. (1998), case studies, which 
involve in-depth interviews, have often been considered only as a qualitative method.  
However, increasingly, researchers utilising this method have quantified case study themes 
employing an encoding process.  This encoding lends itself to statistical analysis of case-study 
results. 
                                                 




Major Research Implications of The Subjective-Objective Approaches 
Utilising the extreme subjectivist and objectivist perspectives, Figure 5 depicts the major 
research implications arising from each perspective.  Objectivists perceive that their  
 
       Positivist Perspective                      Subjectivist Perspective  
 
Independence The observer is independent of what 
is being observed. 
The observer interacts with 




Value-freedom The choice of what to study, and 
how to study it, can be determined 
by objective criteria rather than by 
human beliefs and interests. 
Inherent biasness in the choice of 
what to study, and how to study it 
as researchers are driven by their 




Causality The aim of social science should be 
to identify causal explaintions and 
fundamental laws that explain 
regularities in human social 
behaviour. 
 
The aim of social science is to try 
to understand what is happening. 
No Cause and Effect 
Hypothetico-deductive Science proceeds through a process 
of hypothesising fundamental laws 
and then deducing what kinds of 
observations will demonstrate the 
truth or falsity of these hypotheses. 
 
Develop ideas through induction 
from evidence; mutual 
simultaneous shaping of factors. 
No Hypothetico-
deductive reasoning 
Operationalisation Concepts need to be operationalised 
in a way which enables facts to be 
measured quantitatively; static 
design – categories isolated before 
study. 
Qualitative methods – small 
samples investigated in depth or 
over time; emerging design – 




Reductionism Problems as a whole are better 
understood if they are reduced into 
the simplest possible elements. 
 
Problems as a whole are better 
understood if the totality of the 
situation is looked at. 
No Reductionism 
Generalisation In order to be able to generalise 
about regularities in human and 
social behaviour it is necessary to 
select samples of sufficient size; aim 
of generalisations is to lead to 
prediction, explanation and 
understanding. 
 
Everything is contextual; patterns 
identified – theories then 
developed for understanding. 
Generalisation 
Research Language Formal, based on set definitions; 
impersonal voice; use of accepted 
quantitative words. 
 
Informal, evolving decisions; 




Figure 5:  Key Research Implications of the Subjective and Objective Perspectives 
 
Compiled by authors from:  Easterby-Smith et al. (1991), Hussey and Hussey (1997), Creswell (1994), Remenyi et al. (2000) 
 
studies can be done independently of what is being observed and that their interests, values, 
beliefs, etc. will have no influence on what they study or what methods they use.  They argue 
strongly that research choice and methodological choice are made objectively, that is, the 
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researcher is able to set aside their own set of interests, values, skills, etc.  Objectivists believe 
that they are “independent of and neither affects nor is affected by the subject of the research” 
(Remenyi et al. 1998: 33); any other contention implies that “social scientists are prone to 
employ warped logic and improper treatment of empirical data in order to support views they 
held prior to the investigation” (Gordon 1991: 664).  Hunt (1993) summarises how 
objectivists sustain objectivity:   
Requiring that theories, laws and explanations be empirically testable ensures that they 
will be intersubjectively certifiable since different (but reasonably competent) 
investigators with differing attitudes, opinions, and beliefs will be able to make 
observations and conduct experiments to ascertain their truth content (1). 
 
The major goal of objectivists is aligned with that of the natural scientists – they “identify 
causal explanations and fundamental laws that explain regularities in human social 
behaviour” (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991: 23). To achieve this end, the generalisation of results 
from ample sample sizes is necessary utilising a hypothetico-deductive process.  This process 
entails the formulation of hypotheses developed from the researcher‟s conceptualisation of a 
particular phenomenon. Objectivists believe in causality, that is, “there are independent 
causes that lead to the observed effects” (Remenyi et al. 1998: 32), and hypotheses are either 
verified or refuted by the observed effects. The hypothetico-deductive approach involves the 
quantitative operationalisation of concepts, which involves reductionism, that is, the problem 
is reduced to its smallest elements.  Objectivists believe that reduction enhances a problem‟s 
comprehension. 
 
However, subjectivists such as Weber, Hanson, Kuhn and Feyerabend, argue that researchers 
cannot distance themselves from:  (1) what is being observed, (2) the study‟s subject matter, 
or (3) the methods of study; in other words, the researcher is value-laden with inherent 
biasness reflected by their background, status, interests, beliefs, skills, values, resources, etc. 
(Hunt 1993).  According to Hunt (1993), Kuhn, in his discussion on paradigms, perceived that 
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research results were guided by “the interpretive part of scientific observation and determined 
what researchers “saw”” (4).  Hunt (1993) further states that Kuhn argued that observations 
are theory-laden and are incommensurable, thereby “making objectivity in science 
impossible” (5).  In short, subjectivists argue that the involvement of the researcher should be 
actively encouraged – “phenomenologists attempt to minimise the distance between the 
researcher and that which is being researched” (Hussey and Hussey 1997: 49).  In contrast to 
the objectivists, subjectivists focus on the meaning of social phenomena rather than its 
measurement.  Their goal is to understand and to explain a problem in its contextual setting; 
they do not perceive that it is a question of causality but rather it is a question of the meaning 
individuals attach to a given situation (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991; Hughes and Sharrock 
1997).  Subjectivists believe that it is pointless to categorise phenomena into causes and 
effects because “phenomena are engaged in a process of continuous creation” (Hirschman 
1986: 238).  Furthermore, subjectivists do not utilise reductionalism as they perceive that a 
problem‟s understanding can only be comprehended through investigating the problem in its 
entirety.   
 
Is There a Right Perspective? 
Objectivism has been increasingly criticised as an inappropriate approach to the study of 
social science phenomena.  Critics of objectivism perceive that the explanatory success of 
objectivism in the natural sciences has not been repeated in the social sciences due to its 
significant flaws.  These critics feel that subjectivism is more apposite to the study of social 
science due to the complex nature of social science research, that is, human beings.  
Subjectivism‟s proponents argue that researchers employing a nominalistic ontology and its 
accompanying epistemology realise more explanatory success. However, subjectivism is not 
without its own flaws and critics; its critics consider its most condemning flaw is its inability 
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to replace objectivism with a better approach (Hughes and Sharrock 1997).  Many objectivists 
consider that relativism and incommensurability are other major subjectivist flaws.  Aligned 
with Morgan and Smircich‟s (1980) extreme subjectivist perspective, subjective relativists 
argue that there are many equal versions of reality; each version of reality is “personal and 
community-specific” (Rosenau 1992: 22), hence each view of reality cannot be compared as it 
is considered as good as the next one.  Furthermore, because there is no “absolute basis for 
scientific knowledge” (Hughes and Sharrock 1997: 162-163), theories are incommensurable, 
hence one theory cannot be held as more valid than another.  Relativism and 
incommensurability have serious implications for the concept of scientific progress and have 
been considerably and successfully attacked by critics.  For example, Kuhn has considerably 
altered his perspective on incommensurability (Hunt 1993; Hughes and Sharrock 1997). 
 
As a reaction to the, at times, heated debate between critics of both traditions, many 
researchers note that debates on ontology and epistemology cannot end in any philosophical 
solution; there is no right or wrong philosophical stance.  For example, Connell and Nord 
(1996) argue that:  (1) if reality is external and unknown to humans, then how do we 
accumulate knowledge regarding it? and (2) if we are accumulating knowledge about it, how 
do we know that we‟re doing it?  From this perspective, any philosophical debate is moot 
because we do “…not know how to discover a correct position on the existence of, let alone 
the nature of, reality” (Connell and Nord 1996: 1).  Hughes and Sharrock (1997) concur; they 
too are unable to provide any guideline to an appropriate philosophical stance, stating  
Since the nature of philosophy, and its relationship to other forms of knowledge, is 
itself a major matter of philosophical dispute, there is, of course, no real basis for us to 
advocate any one view on these matters as the unequivocally correct conception of the 
relationship between philosophy and social research (13). 
 
This has led some academics to offer other alternatives, such as Connell and Nord‟s (1996) 
agnostic-interests framework.  Their framework requires the suspension of judgment on 
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ontological and epistemological concerns (therefore becoming an agnostic), and perceiving 
that the controversy is really a matter of differing interests. On the other hand, Eastman and 
Bailey (1996) have suggested that perhaps “philosophy is something to be bracketed in doing 
one‟s disciplinary work, like a love of baseball or devotion to faith” (2), thereby suggesting a 
pragmatic „just get on with it‟ outlook.  Hughes and Sharrock (1997) have stated that several 
contemporary realists and empiricists are pragmatics; they   
do not worry about epistemology and ontology but about the particular problems they 
confront from their theories and investigations…If all that matters is that scientists go 
about their business…using methods appropriate to the problems they have to deal 
with, then philosophical worries about ontology and epistemology are an 
irrelevance…There is certainly no reason to feel bound by stipulations about a unified 
method or a unified ontology for science, for on these arguments no such creature exists 
(94).   
 
With Hughes and Sharrock‟s words in mind, it is questionable whether a caution is warranted 
about a pragmatic approach, that is, applying methods that suit the problem rather than 
methods that suit ontology or epistemology concerns.  Perhaps choosing a philosophical 
stance is not vital to the proper utilisation of research methodology, however, if a researcher 
perceives ontology and epistemology to be irrelevant, then how can they ensure that their 
methods are really appropriate to the problem in hand?  Conceivably the problem could be 
better investigated with a method from an alternative philosophical stance.  For various 
reasons such as past training and skills, researchers may have unthinkingly slotted themselves 
into an objectivist or subjectivist position, not realising that the methods of an alternative 
philosophy may suit their research problem better.  A philosophical review can have a dual 
effect on the researcher:  (1) it may open their mind to other possibilities, therefore, enriching 
their own research abilities, and (2) it can enhance their confidence in the appropriateness of 
their methodology to the research problem which, in turn, enhances confidence in their 
research results.   
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Furthermore, inappropriate matching of methodology and the research problem may result in 
questionable results. Other research methodology writers urge researchers to use both 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies in order to triangulate results (Patton 1990; 
Brannick and Roche 1997).  Gill and Johnson (1997) perceive that a multi-method 
methodology leads to the convergent validation of research results through internal cross-
checking, and the danger of not using a multi-method approach is highlighted by 
anthropologist, Richard Wilk.  His urging of triangulation is due to the conflicting results of 
ethnomethodological
3
 re-inquiries; they represent alternative viewpoints and little else. But 
triangulation is only possible by taking an intermediate philosophical stance.  Such a position 
can allow “for the influence of both situational and voluntary factors in accounting for the 
activities of human beings” (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 6).   
 
An intermediate position implies that reality is tangible yet humans have an input into 
forming its concreteness.  The corresponding epistemological stance is that knowledge 
although not absolute, can be accumulated, tested, and either retained or discarded.  Gordon 
(1991) has posited that all we can do as researchers is to qualify research findings as 
contextually explanatory and probably generalisable, rather than in insisting that findings are 
absolutely certain – gathered evidence should be viewed as building bricks which aid our 
“cognition of the world” (Gordon 1991: 604).  An intermediate stance views human nature as 
both deterministic and voluntaristic, that is, humans are born into an already structured 
society, yet societal structures evolve and change through human interaction.  
 
                                                 
3 Briefly, ethnomethodology is a distinctive subjectivist style of research which calls for an immersion of the 
researcher into “a setting and to become part of the group under study in order to understand the meanings and 
significances that people put upon their own behaviour and that of others” (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991: 38).  The 
focus of an ethnomethodoligist is either linguistical or situational. 
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Similar to Hughes and Sharrock‟s observation concerning pragmatic researchers, Creswell 
(1994) suggests that certain research problems may be better suited to either a quantitative or 
qualitative methodology.  For example, the discussion above stated that the hypothetico-
deductive process involves the verification or falsification of hypotheses developed from a 
theory-driven conceptualisation.  If the problem cannot be conceptualised due to a lack of 
information concerning some or all research variables, how can the objectivist support their 
pursuit of a pure quantitative study that calls for the reduction and operationalisation of their 
conceptualisation? Or are they limiting themselves to investigating only certain social science 
phenomena?  Hence, the impact of the researcher‟s answer to „What to Research?‟ on the 
their philosophical stance. Only the intermediate philosophical position allows the researcher 
room to match their philosophical perspective, methodology, and the problem at hand. 
 
Conclusion 
A review of philosophy is a vital aspect of the research process as it opens researchers‟ minds 
to other possibilities, which can lead to both an enrichment of their research skills and an 
enhancement in their confidence that they are using the appropriate methodology.  Central to 
the questions of „How to research?‟ and „What to research?‟ is the researcher‟s perspective on 
„Why research?‟  This perspective is based on the researcher‟s assumptions concerning the 
inter-related concepts of ontology, epistemology, and human nature.  The science of research 
necessitates that philosophy is regarded as a crucial parameter to „Why research?‟  If 
researchers do not perceive that there is a reality, the utilisation of a nomothetic methodology 
contradicts their research project‟s philosophical underpinning.  This type of inconsistency is 
fallacious to research standards, thereby undermining the very nature of the research 
discipline.   
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Researchers must also bear in mind that „What to research?‟ may have a major impact on 
methodological choice, therefore their philosophical review also engenders a reflection on the 
research problem.  Researchers should consider that certain philosophical positions might 
preclude them from investigating a particular research problem, as the relevant methodology 
may be inappropriate to the problem at hand.  Additionally, the improper matching of 
methodology to the research problem may produce spurious results, ultimately having a 
negative impact on the researcher‟s professionalism and the authority of research science.  We 
perceive that elasticity in „What to research?‟ is gained only through an intermediate 
philosophical position, thereby allowing researchers to match philosophy, methodology, and 
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